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PEACHES, SPEECH, AND CLARENCE THOMAS:
YES, CALIFORNIA, THERE IS A JUSTICE WHO
UNDERSTANDS THE RAMIFICATIONS OF
CONTROLLING COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Jennifer R. Franklin •
When it comes time to interpret the Constitution's provisions, such as,
for instance, the Speech or Press Clauses of the First Amendment,
reasonable minds can certainly differ as to their exact meaning. But
that does not mean that there is no right or correct answer; that there
are no clear, eternal principles recognized and put into motion by our
founding documents. This was the mistake of the legal realists, and it
continues to be the mistake of the critical theorists: law is something
more than merely the preferences of the power elites writ large. The
law is a distinct, independent discipline, with certain principles and
modes of analysis that yield what we can discern to be correct and
incorrect answers to certain problems. I

In April 1996, Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States
Supreme Court spoke at the University of Kansas School of Law as part
of the Stephensen Lectures in Law & Government Series. 2 His address
focused on his philosophy of judging. The above quote from Justice
Thomas's speech, as well as a few that will follow, exemplifies how
Justice Thomas's jurisprudence concerning Constitutional issues,
including those surrounding commercial speech, has been built on the
belief that a correct interpretation of the law exists. a This article focuses
on Justice Thomas's short but pointed dissent in Glickman v. Wileman
Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 4 and how it reflects his jurisprudence on commercial
speech and the First Amendment. The dissent itself is straightforward
and forms a framework to examine Justice Thomas's jurisprudence
section by section.
The first section of this article will address the majority opinion in
Glickman and why the majority came to the conclusion that speech was
not an issue. Second, Justice David Souter's dissenting opinion, with
whom Chief Justice William Rehnquist and Justice Antonin Scalia
Jennifer R. Franklin, B.S., Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University,
1988; J.D., summa cum laude, Regent University School of Law, 1999; Judicial Clerk,
Alabama Supreme Court, Montgomery, Alabama.
t
Hon. Justice Clarence Thomas, Judging, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1996) (This is
an excerpt from a speech given by Justice Thomas at the University of Kansas School of
Law on Apr. 8, 1996).
2
See id.
See id.
521 u.s. 457, 504 (1997).
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joined, will be examined because Justice Thomas joined it except for part
II, to which he strongly objected. Third, the remainder of the article will
focus on Justice Thomas's commercial speech jurisprudence against the
backdrop of his separate dissenting opinion. The quotes from Justice
Thomas's speech provide an understanding about the strength of his
convictions.
I. WHY THE MAJORITY SAYS THAT SPEECH IS SPEECH
EXCEPT WHEN IT IS NOT

On June 25, 1997, the Supreme Court upheld a Federal marketing
program that forces agricultural producers to pay for generic fruit
advertising. 5 In doing so, the majority rejected the lower court's holding
that this requirement was tantamount to compelled speech and thus
violated the First Amendment.s The majority emphasized that simply
because "an economic regulation may indirectly lead to a reduction in a
handler's individual advertising budget does not itself amount to a
restriction on speech."7
The case in question, Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc.,s
was brought by Wileman Bros. and other fruit producers in California to
challenge regulations and requirements under the Agricultural
Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA).9 Wileman Bros.' claim
included a First Amendment challenge to the requirement that fruit
growers in the area subsidize generic advertising. 10 The regulations
challenged were Marketing Orders 916 and 917 that regulate nectarines,
peaches, pears and plums in California. 11 Amendments to both of these
orders over the years have authorized generic advertising of each of
these fruits.I2 Wileman Brothers & Elliott, Inc. is a large fruit producer
in California,I3 In 1987 and 1988, Wileman Brothers had problems with
the maturity and minimum size requirements of some of their fruit
varieties and refused to pay the assessments, subsequently filing a
challenge of the order's standards.I4 In 1988, the fruit producers filed a
See Linda Greenhouse, Agricultural Marketing Effort is Ruled Co118titutional,
N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1997, at D25.
6
See id.
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 470.
ld. at 460.
"Congress enacted the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA),
ch. 296, 50 Stat. 246, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 601 et seq., in order to establish and maintain
orderly marketing conditions and fair prices for agricultural commodities." ld. at 461
(citation omitted).
1o See id. at 462-63.
n
See id. at 463.
12
See id.
13
See id.
14
See id.
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second petition including a challenge to the generic advertising
regulations claiming that it violated their First Amendment right to free
speech because it compelled them to render financial aid to support
commercial speech to which they objected.15 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the fruit producers' statutory
claims but upheld their First Amendment claim and found that the
generic advertising regulations violated the First Amendment.16
Specifically, the court found that the right to freedom of speech, as
protected by the First Amendment, includes the right not to be
compelled to pay for others' speech. 17 The court also applied "the test for
restrictions on commercial speech set out in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York."1B
The Central Hudson test is a
four-part test to determine the constitutionality of commercial speech
regulation: (1) was the speech false or misleading ([i]f so, it could
constitutionally be regulated); (2) does the government regulation
further a substantial interest; (3) does the regulation directly advance
that interest; and (4) could the governmental interest be equally
served ''by a more limited restriction on commercial speech[?]."l9

The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, applying this test, held that the
regulations violated the First Amendment.2o The court held that the
speech was neither misleading nor untruthful, and that the government
did have substantial interests in regulating the market and increasing
returns to the fruit producers.2 1 The government's interests were to
increase demand for the various fruits and, by spreading the cost of
advertising among all of the fruit producers, also to increase the profit
margin.z2 However, the Court of Appeals further held that the
government's actions failed the second prong of the Central Hudson test
because it could not prove that forced generic advertising was more
effective than individual advertising to meet that goal.23 Finally, the
court held that the government's program was not sufficiently "narrowly
tailored" under the fourth prong of the test. 24
See id. at 463-66.
See id. at 465-67.
11
See id. at 466.
1s /d. (quoting Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc. v. Espy, 58 F.3d 1367, 1378 (9th Cir.
1995), referring to Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557
(1980)).
19
Martin H. Redish, First Amendment Theory and the Demise of the Commercial
Speech Distinction: The Case of the Smoking Controversy, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 553, 559 (1997)
(citing and quoting in part Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-64).
20
See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 465.
21
See id. at 466.
22
See id. at 464-66.
23
See id.
24
See id.
1s

1s
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In reviewing the case, the Supreme Court never reached the validity
of the analyf?is employed by the Court of Appeals. 25 The issue, as
articulated by Justice Stevens, was "whether being compelled to fund
this advertising raises a First Amendment issue for us to resolve, or
rather is simply a question of economic policy for Congress and the
Executive to resolve." 26 According to Justice Stevens, speech restraints
must reach one of three levels to be viewed under the higher scrutiny
standard attached to First Amendment issues: First, they must impose
"restraint on the freedom of any producer to communicate any message
to any audience[;]" or second, they must "compel any person to engage in
any actual or symbolic speech[;]" or third they must compel a person to
endorse or fund political or ideological views. 27 Justice Stevens wrote
that the restraints must be viewed under the same standard as all
"anticompetitive features of the marketing orders" if none of these levels
are implicated.2s
The Supreme Court rejected the producers' argument that the
government had essentially deprived them of the opportunity to finance
their own advertisements by forcing them to subsidize generic
advertisements, thereby restricting their ability to "communicate any
message to any audience."29 According to Justice Stevens, "[T]he First
Amendment has never been construed to require heightened scrutiny of
any financial burden that has the incidental effect of constraining the
size of a firm's advertising budget."30
The Supreme Court also rejected the argument that the subsidy
assessment~ compelled speech as it had previously been defined. The
producers were not required to repeat "objectionable message[s] out of
their own mouths; use their own property to convey an antagonistic
ideological message; ... respond ... when they 'would prefer to remain
silent;"' or publicly identify themselves as associated with the message. 31
Justice Stevens pointed out that while the First Amendment prohibits
the compulsion of anyone to render financial support for others' speech,
the appellate court misread the Court's holding in Abood.32 Abood
recognizes the right not to be forced to fund "an organization whose
25
26
27

2s

See id. at 468.
/d.
/d. at 469-70 (footnotes omitted).
/d. at 470.

Id. at 469.
!d. at 470.
31
/d. at 471 (citing West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of
Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 18 (1986) (plurality opinion); and PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447
u.s. 74 (1980)).
32
See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 471 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S.
209, 235 (1977)).
29

30
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expressive activities conflict with one's 'freedom of belief."'33 According to
Stevens and the majority opinion, the subsidy assessments did not rise
to those levels because they did not interfere with "the notion that an
individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather
than coerced by the State."34 In the Court's opinion, Stevens wrote,
[R]equiring [producers] to pay the assessments cannot be said to
engender any crisis of conscience. None of the advertising in this
record promotes any particular message other than encouraging
consumers to buy California tree fruit. Neither the fact that
[producers] may prefer to foster that message independently in order
to promote and distinguish their own products, nor the fact that they
think more or less money should be spent fostering it, makes this case
comparable to those in which an objection rested on political or
ideological disagreement with the content of the message.as

Justice Stevens concluded by pointing out that a majority of
producers in the area had to approve the advertising and that these
decisions, acceptable for other regulatory programs, should be no less
acceptable for promotional advertising. 36 The promotional advertising
programs, dubbed a "species of economic regulation," should "enjoy the
same strong presumption of validity that we accord to other policy
judgments made by Congress."37 The dissatisfaction with the program by
"one or more producers . . . is not a sufficient reason for overriding the
judgment of the majority of market participants, bureaucrats, and
legislators who have concluded that such programs are beneficial." 38
Therefore, the producers' suit was summarily dismissed and the Court
ruled in favor of the government.a9
II. WHY JUSTICE SOUTER PARTED COMPANY WITH THE COURT

Justice Souter dissented from the majority because it decided that
there was "no First Amendment right to be free of coerced subsidization
of commercial speech."4o Justice Souter wrote early in his dissenting
opinion that the "very reasons for recognizing that commercial speech
falls within the scope of First Amendment protection" should also afford
protection against being compelled to subsidize speech as well. 41 He
33
34

35
36

37

3s
39

•o
41

Id.
Id. at 472 (quoting Abood, 431 U.S. at 234-35) (internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 472.
See id. at 476.
Id. at 477.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 477-78.
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believed that the Court should have examined the coerced payments
under the same scrutiny used to examine restrictions on commercial
speech. 42
While Justice Souter agreed with the majority that a proper
understanding of its holding in Abood was necessary to review this case,
he pointed to two more fundamental basics from which the Court should
start in any speech analysis. 43 The first basic principle of First
Amendment law is that speech should be allowed some form of
protection unless it is part of a category beyond the scope of the First
Amendment. 44 Second, speech subject to this protection may not become
either "the subject of coercion to speak or coercion to subsidize speech."45
Justice Souter explained that fundamentally, the Court has always
recognized that "[a]ll ideas having even the slightest redeeming social
importance ... have the full protection of the guaranties" of the First
Amendment. 46 In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 4 7 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
commercial speech and determined that truthful, non-misleading
commercial speech should be granted the same protection as noncommercial speech. 4B Not only should it be granted protection, but it
deserves protection because the claim that commercial speech is socially
unimportant fails when the court weighs the interest a consumer has in
obtaining information with the value of economically promoting one's
"wares."49 Commercial speech in its persuasive nature yields a power to
inform, and the link between commercial speech and the resulting
commercial transactions greatly increases the importance of its message
to those involved. so Souter pointed out that if the First Amendment
protects commercial speech from suppression, it should also provide
compelled commercial speech the same level of suspicion and scrutiny. 51
Justice Souter cited cases that have recognized that First Amendment
guarantees include "decision[s] of both what to say and what not to
say."52 Souter accused the majority of drawing the wrong conclusions
See id. at 478.
See id.
4•
See id. (False or misleading advertisements and illegal speech are all beyond the
scope of the First Amendment).
45
!d.
46
!d. at 478-79 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)) (internal
quotations omitted).
47
425 u.s. 748 (1976).
48
See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 479.
49
!d.
so See id. at 479-80.
51
See id. at 480-81.
52
I d. at 481 (quoting Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796-97
(1988), and citing Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, Inc., 515
42

•a
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from Abood. 53 The majority held that Abood stood for limits on compelled
financing of speech only where the speech is ideological, political, or "not
germane to an otherwise lawful regulatory program."54 Justice Souter
pointed out that later decisions, such as Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass'n,ss
have clarified the holding in Abood56 and shown that in order for a
mandatory fee to survive analysis it "must not only be germane to some
otherwise legitimate regulatory scheme; it must also be justified by vital
policy interests of the government and not add significantly to the
burdening of free speech inherent in achieving those interests."5 7
Justice Souter then analogized the compelled fruit advertising to
the Court's treatment of compelled public relations effort espousing the
virtues of teachers in Lehnert. 58 Just as teachers cannot be compelled to
fund generic advertisements intended to increase the public's image of
teachers, fruit producers should not be compelled to fund generic
advertisements that are intended to increase the public's demand for
fruit. 59 Having a legitimate interest in regulating the market for fruit or
increasing the public's perception of teachers does not mean that the
most narrowly tailored means to accomplish these ideals is to advertise
the virtues of either fruit or teaching. so If the First Amendment rights of
teachers protect them from having to subsidize public relations efforts
that are generically focused on promoting teachers, then the rights of
fruit producers should be similarly protected.6 1 Because Congress has
been able to regulate the agricultural industry with no advertising
schemes in the past, Congress should be able to continue such regulation
without forcing the fruit producers to fund advertisements with which
they do not agree.6 2 In comparing the fruit producers to the teachers in
Lehnert, Justice Souter wrote, "In each instance, the challenged burden
on dissenters' First Amendment rights is substantially greater than
anything inherent in regulation of the commercial transactions." 63
U.S. 557 (1995); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)).
53
See id. at 483·84.
54
Id. at 483.
55
500 u.s. 507 (1991).
56
See Glickman, 521 U.S. at 485.
57
ld. (citing Lehnert, 500 U.S. at 519) (emphasis added).
sa See id. at 485. In Lehnert, the Court held "that a teachers' union could not
constitutionally charge objecting employees for a public relations campaign meant to raise
the esteem for teachers in the public mind and so increase the public's willingness to pay
for public education." ld. at 485 (citations omitted).
59
See id.
60
See id.
61
See id.
62
See id.
63
ld. at 486.
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The second reason that Justice Souter dissented from the majority
is the majority's proposition that compelled subsidization is proper when
the speech is not political or ideological. 64 Souter asserted that the
majority erred when it failed to recognize that producers still may
"disagree" with the generic ads even if the speech was neither political
nor ideological.G5 The producers did not agree with the portion of the ads
that suggested that all fruit is equal.GG Each producer believed that his
fruit warranted "more particular claims about the merits of their own
brands." 67 Justice Souter argued that compelled funding deserves the
same level of scrutiny (which in his opinion means the application of the
Central Hudson test) afforded restrictions on commercial speech or at
very least to the same analysis used to test the compulsion of noncommercial speech. ss
Justice Souter's scrutiny of the orders requiring subsidies by the
producers followed the same Central Hudson test that the lower court
used. Under the analysis, Justice Souter concluded that the Secretary of
Agriculture failed to meet three of the four prongs of the Central Hudson
test because the government's interest was not "substantial," the
regulations did not necessarily advance the government's interest, nor
did the government sufficiently narrowly tailor the regulations.69 Justice
Souter undertook a lengthy and detailed analysis of each prong of the
Central Hudson test in reaching his conclusion. However, Souter's use of
the Central Hudson test is where he and Justice Thomas part company
and his analysis of the test reaches a similar conclusion as the appellate
court. 70 Therefore, that analysis will not be discussed in this article.

III. JUSTICE THOMAS'S VERY SHORT DISSENT
This dissent is one of the shortest opinions that Justice Thomas has
written in his tenure on the Supreme Court. Yet, in this very short
space, he succinctly makes his point. His dissent makes two statements.
First, while he agrees with part one of Justice Souter's dissent, he
sharply disagrees with part two and the use of the Central Hudson
Test. 71 Second, he is alarmed with the majority's conclusion that this
case does not raise a First Amendment Issue. 72

64

ss
66
67
68
69

10
71
72

See id. at 487.
See id. at 488.
See id.
ld. at 489.
See id. at 489·90.
See id. at 491-92.
See id. at 504.
See id.
See id.
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This section of the article examines Justice Thomas's statements in
his dissent. First, the article focuses on Justice Thomas's express
opinions on commercial speech and the First Amendment. Second, the
article demonstrates Justice Thomas's jurisprudence through his
opinions and the cases he relied on for support.
A. I join Justice Souter's dissent, with the exception of Part IL My join is

thus limited because I continue to disagree with the use of the Central
Hudson balancing test and the discounted weight given to commercial
speech generally. Because the regulation at issue here fails even the more
lenient Central Hudson test, however, it, a fortiori, would fail the higher
standard that should be applied to all speech, whether commercial or
not.13

In April 1996, Justice Clarence Thomas of the United States
Supreme Court spoke at the University of Kan·s as School of Law as part
of the Stephensen Lectures in Law & Government Series. 74 His address
focused on his philosophy of judging. This excerpt, as well as a few that
will follow, build a foundation for his jurisprudence concerning
Constitutional issues, including those surrounding commercial speech. 75
Justice Thomas, in his speech, talked about the use of balancing tests by
the Supreme Court:
It is always tempting to adopt balancing tests or to rest one's decision
on the presence or absence of various factors. Judges can then say that
they decided the case on its facts, thereby preserving some degree of
flexibility for future cases. While this may be appropriate for trial
courts, or for state courts, it is not always the best approach for the
Supreme Court or an appellate court. Whenever possible, the Court
and judges generally should adopt clear, bright-line rules that, as I
like to say to my clerks, you can explain to the gas station attendant
as easily as you can explain to a law professor. Rules not only provide
private parties with notice, they also limit judicial discretion by
narrowing the ability of judges in the future to alter the law to fit their
policy preferences. If the Court holds broadly today, for example, that
all anonymous leafleting is to be given Firsi Amendment protection,
then a future Court will not have wiggle room to reverse course to
remove that protection for leaflets that turn out to be written by an
unpopular group, like the Nazis. Broader rules are more likely to be
impartial in their impact on and application to specific parties. Thus,

73
Jd. at 504 (emphasis added and citations omitted) Justice Thomas's dissent, in
full , will be used for point headings in this section of the article.
74
See Thomas, supra note 1.
75
See id.
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clear rules-along with life tenure and an irreducible salaryencourage judges to maintain their impartiality. 76

In 1980, the Court adopted the four part Central Hudson balancing
test that was used by the appellate court and by Justice Souter. 77 The
adoption of this test rather than the application of traditional tests was
based on the "'common sense' distinction between speech proposing a
commercial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to.
government regulation, and other varieties of speech."7B The Court held
that while commercial speech that is neither misleading nor related to
unlawful activities is protected by the Constitution, other forms of
expression are afforded greater protection. 79 Also, protection for
commercial speech from governmental regulation depends on the nature
of the speech and the nature of the governmental interests served by
that regulation.so Limited protection for commercial speech does not
apply to speech that is more likely to deceive than inform the consumer.
Therefore, the limited protection circumscribes only the government's
power to regulate speech that "is neither misleading nor related to
unlawful activity."B 1 This need to evaluate the limitations on the power
of the government to regulate lawful, informative speech led to the
adoption of the Central Hudson test.s2
Thomas, writing for the majority in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,sa
faithfully applied the Central Hudson test in determining that
restrictions prohibiting alcohol levels to be displayed on beer bottles
violated the First Amendment.B4 In that case, Justice Stevens concurred
in the judgment but held that the Central Hudson test should have been
inapplicable because the government sought neither to regulate
misleading speech nor to protect consumers from incomplete or
inaccurate information.ss Justice Stevens questioned the rationale
behind the Central Hudson test by suggesting that the test itself "is not
related to the reasons for allowing more regulation of commercial speech
than other speech."Bs Yet, at that time, Justice Thomas held firmly to the
Central Hudson test.B7
76

Id. at 7.

447 u.s. 557 (1980).
ld. at 562 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 {1978)
(internal quotes omitted)).
79
See id. at 563.
so See id.
81
ld. at 564.
82
See id.
83
514 u.s. 476 (1995).
a. See id.
as See id. at 492.
86
ld. at 493.
87
See id. at 491.
77

78
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Just slightly over a year later, however, Justice Stevens delivered
the opinion of the Court and applied the Central Hudson test in 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island.BB Justice Thomas concurred in the
judgment but denounced the use of the test.s9 44 Liquormart concerned a
ban on the use of prices in liquor advertisements in a state effort to
temper the use of alcohol. 90 Justice Stevens recognized that the main
reason commercial speech is more susceptible to government regulation
is because the state has a vested interest in protecting consumers from
"commercial harms."9 1 Therefore, when a ban targets speech that is not
misleading it can be presumed that the underlying reason is a
government fear not that the public will be misled or deceived but "that
the public will respond 'irrationally' to the truth."92 On this basis, Justice
Stevens determined that Rhode Island's ban on truthful, non-misleading
information required evaluation under the strict Central Hudson
analysis.93 Mter applying the analysis, the Court held that Rhode Island
failed to meet the burden required by the Central Hudson test: that a
complete ban on advertising was justified to meet a compelling interest
and that it also advanced that interest to a material degree.94 In this
case, Rhode Island was not justified in placing a complete ban on liquor
price advertisements in an effort to promote temperance. Further, there
was no satisfactory proof to show that such a ban was successful in
promoting temperance through decreased liquor sales. 95
Justice Thomas's concurrence began with a bold, straightforward
statement:
In cases such as this, in which the government's asserted interest is to
keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in order to
manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the balancing test
adopted in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission of New York, 96 should not be applied, in my view. Rather,
such an "interest is per se illegitimate and can no more justify
regulation of commercial speech than it can justify regulation of noncommercial speech. 97

Rhode Island's stated interest was to promote temperance, an act they
purported to achieve through eliminating "sale" prices in ads, which
88

s9

so
91
92
93

9•
95

517 u.s. 484 (1996).
See id. at 518.
See id. at 490.
ld. at 502. See Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 426 (1993).
ld. See Linmark Assoc., Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 96 (1977).
See id. at 508.

See id.
See id.

447 u.s. 557 (1980).
44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 518 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
96

97
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would result in an increase in noncompetitive retail price levels.98
Justice Thomas explained that this type of regulation on the part of the
states is paternalistic in nature and deprives consumers of the right to
evaluate the information themselves and make informed choices.99
Justice Thomas lauded the cases that have stressed the need to protect
commercial speech and the importance of freely available consumer
information after the Court first recognized the right to protection in
Virginia Pharmacy .1oo
On the other hand, Justice Thomas also recognized that there
seemed to be a trend to allow the suppression of information if, in fact,
the government can show that its regulations were successful.IOl This
trend is based on the assumption that commercial "speech was in a
'subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values."'1o2 Justice
Thomas wrote, "I do not see a philosophical or historical basis for
asserting that 'commercial' speech is of 'lower value' than
'noncommercial' speech. Indeed, some historical materials suggest to the
contrary."l03 According to Thomas, the Court has never raised a valid
explanation to justify restricting commercial speech that is neither
misleading nor connected with illegal activities.l04 Therefore, Justice
Thomas believes that applying the Central Hudson test to cases where
the state's interest is to manipulate the marketplace by "keeping
consumers ignorant" contradicts the "rationale for protecting
'commercial' speech."1os
See id. at 504.
See id. at 519.
100 See id. at 520. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U .S. 748 (1976). Accord Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U .S. 476 (1995);
98

99

Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985) (stating that "[t]here is no longer any room
to doubt that what has come to be known as 'commercial speech' is entitled to the
protection of the First Amendment, albeit to protection somewhat less extensive than that
afforded 'noncommercial speech."'); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U .S. 60, 69
(1983) (advertising of contraceptives protected because it "implicates 'substantial
individual and societal interests' in the free flow of commercial information, but also
relates to activity which is protected from unwarranted state interference."); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (recognizing that even a commercial advertisement is possible in
generating public interest.); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 351 (1977) (ruled that
blanket advertising ban on attorneys would deprive consumers of "at least some of the
relevant information needed for an informed decision"); Linmark Assoc. , Inc. v. Township
of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (holding that a ban on "for sale" and "sold" real estate
signs violated First Amendment because state was trying to prevent white homeowners
from "irrationally" leaving the town).
1o1 See 44 Liquormart, 517 U.S. at 521 .
102 ld. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U .S. 447, 456 (1978)).
103 ld. at 522.
104 See id. at 523.
105 ld. at 523-24.
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Although a stricter application of the test would yield results
consistent with Thomas's views, he would still adhere to the principle
found in Virginia Pharmacy, "that all attempts to dissuade legal choices
by citizens by keeping them ignorant are impermissible." 106 According to
Thomas, the test leads to the use of individual judicial preferences.l07
These preferences, Thomas fears, simply become inserted for those
preferences being exerted by the legislature when restrictions are
originally placed on commercial speech.108 The Central Hudson test,
according to Thomas, asks courts to determine if the legislature was
correct in its assumption that its citizens cannot be trusted to determine
for themselves, based upon the free flow of information, that
consumption of a product is harmful enough to be avoided.l09 Justice
Thomas would avoid the paternalism associated not only with the
legislature's actions but also with the Central Hudson test by returning
to the decision of Virginia Pharmacy. no

B. I write separately to note my disagreement with the majority's conclusion
that coerced funding of advertising does not involve "speech" at all and
does not even raise a First Amendment "issue., It is one thing to differ
about whether a particular regulation involves an "abridgment" of the
freedom of speech, but it is entirely another matter~nd a complete
repudiation of our precedent-for the majority to deny that "speech" is
even at issue in this case.m
In his opinion in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.,ll2 Justice Thomas
traced the development of the recognition of commercial advertising as
speech.ua Prior to Virginia Pharmacy,11 4 the Court's position was that
paid advertising did not constitute protected speech under the First
Amendment. 115 The opinion in Virginia Pharmacy repudiated that
position when the Court held that the "free flow of commercial
information [was] 'indispensable to the proper allocation of resources in
a free enterprise system."'us Since Virginia Pharmacy, the Court has

106
10 7
108
109
11 0

m

added).
112

m
114
11s
116

Id. at 526.
See id. at 527.
See id. at 528.
See id.
See id.
Glickman u. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 504 (1997) (emphasis
514 u.s. 476 (1995).
See id. at 481-82.
425 u.s. 748 (1976).
See 514 U.S. at 481.
ld.
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recognized that payment for advertising constitutes commercial speech
that is worthy of protection by the First Amendment.n7
L "In numerous cases, this Court has recognized that paying money for the
purposes of advertising involves speech."US
In Justice Thomas's dissenting opinion, he relies on four cases for
the proposition that the Court had "recognized that paying money for the
purposes of advertising involves speech."U9 As early as 1976, the same
year that Virginia Pharmacy was decided, the Court held that
contributions and acts of expenditures were more than conduct, they
were forms of speech.12o The Court recognized that some forms of
communication, involving speech or conduct or both, are made possible
by "the giving and spending of money." 121 However, the Court has "never
suggested that the dependence of a communication on the expenditure of
money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to reduce the
exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment."l22 The Court in
Buckley v. Valeo held that individual contributions to campaigns could
be limited. 123 However, limiting expenditures, such as those for
campaign advertising, was unconstitutional because it abridged the First
Amendment's protection of such "speech."l24
A year later, in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 125 the Court
dealt with the use of union dues or service fees used to finance political
or ideological advertising.l26 The fact that the issue was their payment
for the "speech," and not the actual "speech" itself, did not deter the
Court from finding that First Amendment issues were implicated. 127 In
First National Bank v. Bellotti, 12s the Court recognized the right of a
corporation to use its resources to commercially fight a proposed
constitutional amendment.l29 The Court rejected the theory that in order
for commercial speech to be protected, it had to be pertinent to the
corporation's business interests. 130 The Court held that the implications
m
11s
119
120
121
122
12 3
12•
125
126
127
128

129
130

See 521 U.S. at 505.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
ld.
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
ld. at 16.
/d. at 16·17 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975)).
See id. at 143.
Id.
431 u.s. 209 (1977).
See id. at 234.
See id.
435 u.s. 765 (1978).
See id. at 767.
See id. at 783.

HeinOnline -- 12 Regent U. L. Rev. 640 1999-2000

PEACHES, SPEECH, AND CLARENCE THOMAS

2000]

641

of the First Amendment are not limited solely to the expression of the
individual but also to the free flow of information available to the
public. 131 Commercial speech is protected because of the societal benefit
it bestows as much as because of an individual's right to express
himself. 132
Finally, in Central Hudson, the Court recognized that
advertisements promoting the use of electricity qualified as speech under
the First Amendment.taa The Court defined commercial speech as
"expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its
audience."l34 The state had a legitimate interest, due to an energy
shortage, in discouraging the use of electricity.tas The Court maintained
that its acceptance of First Amendment protection was to reject the view
that the government has the "complete power" to regulate this type of
commercial speech.tas Because of the high cost of mass media, from the
distribution of pamphlets to the production of television commercials,
virtually all forms of commercial speech must be monetarily financed.t37
The Supreme Court's decisions since 1976 have consistently held that
monetary support of commercial advertising involves protected speech.
2. "The Court also has recognized that compelling speech raises a First
Amendment issue just as much as restricting speech." 138

Justice Thomas cited several cases that outline the history of the
Court's recognition that compelled speech is a First Amendment issue. 139
The Supreme Court addressed the problem of compelled speech within
the context of the First Amendment in West Virginia State Board of
Education u. Barnette.140 In that case, the Court decided that compelling
elementary school children to salute the flag was unconstitutional. 141
The Court defined the issue not as whether the ideology being expressed
was good or bad, nor whether the noncompliance with the mandate to
salute was for religious reasons, but whether the First Amendment
protected the children's right not to salute.1 4 2 The Court held that the

131
132

See id.
See id.

u.s. 557 (1980).

133

447

1:U

ld. at 561.
See id.
See id. at 562.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 505.
See id. at 505 n .2.

135
136
131
138
139
140
141
142

319 u.s. 624 (1943).
See id. at 642.
See id. at 641-42.
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First Amendment protected against compelled speech as strongly as it
protected against suppressed speech.143
In 1974, the Court in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillot44
again addressed the issue of compelled speech when a Florida newspaper
refused to print replies by a candidate for office after the newspaper had
critically cited him in its editorials.t 4s The candidate then sued the paper
under a statute that required newspapers to provide an opportunity for
candidates to reply to unfavorable press. 146 The Supreme Court held that
the statute was unconstitutional because compelling a newspaper to
print what it believes is against "reason" to print is a violation of the
protections afforded the press un9er the First Amendment. 147 The Court
noted that even if the Florida statute did not create any added burden
upon the newspapers, it still failed the test under the First Amendment
because it intruded upon the choice of what to publish, how much to
publish, which ideas to publish, and all other essential elements of the
editorial function.148
In 1977, the Court addressed the issue of compelled speech when it
held that the state of New Hampshire could not compel its citizens to
display the state motto, "Live Free or Die," on license plates. 149 The
defendants were prosecuted for violating a statute by covering up the
words on their license plate. 150 The Court held that the statute in
question compelled its citizens to "use their private property as a 'mobile
billboard' for the State's ideological message or suffer a penalty ... ."151
Because the First Amendment protects individuals' rights to their own
ideologies and points of view, it also protected their right not to support
a view to which they objected.1s2
In Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 153 the
Supreme Court held that a gas company could not be compelled to
include a third party's literature in the company's billings to
customers.t54 For 62 years, the gas company distributed a monthly
newsletter of its own.tss However, when a group objected to that practice,
the commission found that the space in the envelopes left over after all
See id. at 642.
418
241 (1974).
See id. at 243;
146 See id. at 244.
1n See id. at 256.
148 See id. at 258.
1•s See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U .S. 705 (1977).
150 See id. at 708.
151 ld. at 715.
152 See id. at 715.
153 475
1 (1986).
154 See id. at 20·21.
155 See id. at 5.
143

144
145

u.s.

u.s.
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necessary materials were included belonged, not to the gas company, but
to the "rate payers." 156 The commission then ordered the gas company to
include newsletters published by a third party four times a year, only
allowing the gas company to distribute its own newsletter if there was
enough space left or if they added postage. 157 The gas company objected
to being forced to distribute literature that contradicted its beliefs.1sa
The Supreme Court held first that the company's own newsletter
was protected speech under the First Amendment and not subject to
suppression.159 Second, the Court held that compelling the gas company
to include the newsletters of a group whose views were in opposition to
those of the gas company infringed upon the company's rights under the
First Amendment. 160 This type of compelled speech would force the gas
company to either appear to agree with the opposing view or respond.161
The commission's order required the gas company to associate with the
views of others who were chosen on the basis of their viewpoints.
Therefore, the Court held that the commission's decision must have been
designed to fulfill a compelling state interest through a regulation of
"time: place, or manner" and that the order must have been narrowly
tailored to fulfill the interest. 162 These cases, as well as many others,
support the contention that governmental compulsion of speech is
antithetical to the First Amendment.163

C. Given these two elemental principles of our First Amendment
jurisprudence, it is incongruous to suggest that forcing fruit-growers to
contribute to a collective advertising campaign does not even involve
speech, while at the same time effectively conceding that forbidding a
fruit-grower from making those same contributions voluntarily would
violate the First Amendment. . . . Yet, that ~precisely what the majority
opinion does.164

Id. at 5-6.
See id. at 6.
158 See id. at 7.
159 See id. at 8.
160 Seeid.at14-17.
161 See id. at 15-16.
162 Id. at 20-21.
163 See, e.g., Abood u. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234 (1977) (holding that
compulsion of speech "works no less an infringement of . . . constitutional rights" than
prohibition of political contributions); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
(1980) (holding that compelling the use of private property for the distribution of leaflets
violates the First Amendment).
164 Glickman, 521 U.S. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
156
157
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Justice Thomas's constitutional interpretation is simple: look to the
text and then, only if it is not clear, look to the Framers.1ss In his speech
at the University of Kansas, he said, "[W]hen interpreting the
Constitution, judges should seek the original understanding of the
provision's text, if that text's meaning· is not readily apparent."166 The
text of the First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; pr abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances." 167 The amendment does not specifically include
or exclude commercial speech. Yet, the Court has traditionally
maintained that commercial speech either has had no protection or only
limited protection. From Justice Thomas's opinions, it is apparent that
he believes the Court in Virginia Pharmacy was accurate in its
determination of how the First Amendment should apply to commercial
speech. 1GB
Virginia Pharmacy was a suit brought by Virginia consumers who
challenged a law making it illegal for licensed pharmacists to advertise
the prices of prescription drugs. 169 In that case, the Court addressed
several concerns about applying the First Amendment to commercial
speech. The Court held that commercial speech was protected by the
First Amendment and that it could not lose that protection simply
because it is in paid advertising; in a form sold for profit (like a
magazine); or in a solicitation. 170 In fact, the Court specifically stated
that "[i]f there is a kind of speech that lacks all First Amendment
protection, ... it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech
whose content deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a
commercial subject."171
Commercial speech, like all speech, may lose some of its First
Amendment protection in certain ways. The Court defined those ways by
1ss See Thomas, supra note 1, at 6.

ld.
U .S. CONST. amend. l.
166 See generally Glickman, 521 U.S. at 504-06 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (disagreeing
with the majority giving discounted weight to commercial speech); Rubin v. Coors Brewing
Co., 514 U .S. 476, 481-82 (1995) (recognizing that Virginia Pharmacy repudiated earlier
beliefs that commercial speech deserved no protection); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-23 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (using the holding in Virginia Pharmacy to show how courts "can no more
justify regulation of 'commercial' speech than it can justify regulation of 'non-<:ommercial'
speech.").
169 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748 (1976).
170 See id. at 761.
171 ld.
166

167
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stating, first, that there may be regulations placed upon commercial
speech that restrict the time, manner, and place of the speech.t72 The
Court had previously allowed for these restrictions only under certain
provisions. 173 Namely, the restrictions must not be content based, they
must serve a significant governmental interest, and they must leave
alternative means for communication.l74
Second, regulations, affecting not only commercial speech but also
all other types of speech, may be used to suppress false or misleading
statements.t75 The Court, citing earlier cases, noted that "[u]ntruthful
speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for its own
sake."l76 The Court even allowed for regulations that curtail the use of
deceptive, though not completely false, advertising. 177 These regulations,
according to the Court, could take the form of requiring disclaimers and
warnings "as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive."l7S The Court
relied on the fact that the truthfulness of commercial speech is very
easily verified and controlled since deceptive advertising would
ultimately have a very chilling effect on profits.'79
Finally, the Court acknowledged that a State has the authority to
control and suppress speech that is illegal or that deals with illegal
activity, whether it is commercially based or not.tso Justice Stewart, in
his concurring opinion, stated, "There is ... little need to sanction 'some
falsehood in order to protect speech that matters."' 1B1 Indeed, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the only difference between
commercial speech and noncommercial speech is that commercial speech
is based on factual representations and therefore does not operate with
the ideological freedom that is found in non-commercial speech. 182 So,
where the falsity of non-commercial speech is tempered through the give
and take of ideas, commercial speech has a heightened responsibility to
provide truthful, non-misleading information.tsa
The Court in Virginia Pharmacy concluded by holding that a State
could not suppress "concededly truthful information about entirely

See id. at 771.
See id.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 Id. at 771 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974);
Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961)).
177 See id. at 771-72.
178 Id. at 772.
179 See id. at 772 n.24.
180 See id. at 772.
181 Id. at 777-78 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341).
182 See id. at 778 (Stewart, J., concurring).
183 See id.
172
173
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lawful activity . . . ."184 The fear that the information will negatively
impact the speakers or the consumers or recipients does not justify the
deprivation of this fundamental right of self-expression.185 While the
Court allowed for regulation of commercial speech because, as Justice
Stewart put it, "Commercial price and product advertising differs
markedly from ideological expression .... "186 Those exceptions applied
untruthful,
misleading,
deceptive
and/or
illegal
only
to
communications.l87
In Glickman,t88 however, the Court addressed speech that fell into
none of the excepted categories. The commercials were truthful, generic
advertisements not designed to deceive or mislead.l89 There was no
indication that non-participation by fruit growers would lead to
deceptive advertisements or that consumers would be misled by specific,
non-generic advertisements by growers who believe that their fruit is
the best. Yet, the government still sought to regulate the dissemination
of commercial speech about the virtues of fruit. By stating that this
regulation does not implicate speech, the Court allowed Congress' power
to regulate the agricultural industry to preempt First Amendment
protections.

D. What we are now left with, if we are to take the majority opinion at face
value, is one of two disturbing consequences: Either (1) paying for
advertising is not speech at all, while such activities as draft card
burning, flag burning, armband wearing, public sleeping and nude
dancing are, or (2) compelling payment for third party communication
does not implicate speech, and thus the Government would be free to
force payment for a whole variety of expressive conduct that it could not
restrict. In either case, surely we have lost our way. 190
It seems absurd that in an age where the activities Justice Thomas
describes are all considered protected "speech" under the First
Amendment, the Court would say that coerced payment for advertising
is not speech.l91 As Justice Thomas said, "We as a nation adopted a
written Constitution precisely because it has a fixed meaning that does

187

Id. at 773.
See id.
Id. at 778 (Stewart, J., concurring).
See id. at 773.

188

521 U.S. at 477-482 (Souter, J., dissenting).

189

See id.
!d. at 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
See id. at 506 n.4 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Clark v.

184

185
186

190
191

Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984); Schad v. Borough of Mount
Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981); Tinker v. Des Moines lndep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968)).
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not change." 192 Simply because Congress enacted regulations for decades
that control the agricultural market does not mean that its use of power
gives it the ability to undermine the clear written expression of the
Constitution and its amendments. In Glickman, the regulations do not
serve compelling state interests nor are they designed to protect citizens
from the abuse of the right to freedom of expression. To stop short of
recognizing the speech implicated in this case is to deny the protection
afforded by the First Amendment. As Thomas recognized, the Court,
loyal to a balancing test that it adopted and blind to its implications, has
"surely lost [its] way."l93

192
193

Thomas, supra note ·1, at 7.
Glickman, 521 U.S. at 506.
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